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“Watching and waiting” and “much ado about
nothing”? Making sense of the Israeli response
to the Arab uprisings
Martin Beck1
ABSTRACT This article covers Israel’s response to the Arab uprisings. The analysis deals
with the issue of both material and immaterial political actions of the Israeli political lea-
dership. A theoretical approach based on “thin rationalism”—actors pursue strategies based
on their preferences—encompassing orthodox and heterodox schools of thought of Inter-
national Relations (Neo-Realism, Institutionalism, Liberalism and a Copenhagen School-
inspired concept of international securitization) is developed and applied to the case. The
article contributes to the solution of a research puzzle. On the one hand, Israel’s material
political action followed a watching-and-waiting approach, as Israel refrained from actively
interfering in the domestic affairs of Arab countries highly affected by the Arab uprisings. On
the other hand, in terms of political communication, major executive branches of the Israeli
state pursued a harsh policy: the “Arab Spring” was presented to the global public as a
dangerous threat to Israel’s security. Major results at the empirical level are that Israel—seen
through the spectacles of the three orthodox schools of thought—was never seriously
threatened by the Arab uprisings, which contributes to explaining why Israel’s material policy
was rather equanimous. At the same time, the harsh Israeli policy at the level of political
communication is made sense of as a policy that added to Israel’s attempts to legitimize its
occupation of Palestine toward the (Western-dominated) international community. At the
theoretical level, further application of the securitization approach aimed at the international
level is encouraged. This article is published as part of a collection on analyzing security
complexes in a changing Middle East.
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Introduction
There can be hardly any doubt that Israel, as a state situatedin a predominantly Arab environment, was deeply affectedin its regional relations by the “Arab Spring.”1 However, as
will be discussed later in further detail, close to six years after the
beginning of the Arab uprisings, it seems safe to state that at no
point in history did these events and their repercussions pose any
severe threat to Israel. In particular, the Israeli relationship with
Jordan remained stable; the Palestinians were hardly mobilized by
the “Arab Spring”, and insofar as they were, the protests were
directed primarily against the Palestinian Authority and Hamas,
respectively, rather than Israel (Pace, 2013; Leech, 2015: 1022–
1023);2 although cooperation between the Israeli and Egyptian
governments became less intense in the period of Muhamad
Mursi’s presidency, close Israeli—Egyptian military cooperation
remained functional under his reign and intensiﬁed under the
leadership of his successor, Abdul Fatah al-Sisi; the peace treaty
between the two countries was never at stake; and the turmoil in
Syria and Iraq proved to be very inner-Arab, Arab—Kurdish, and
Turkish—Kurdish oriented. At the same time, major events with
higher relevance for Israel’s security—such as the escalation of the
conﬂict between Hamas and Israel in 2014 and the interrelated
suspension of ﬂights to Ben Gurion Airport by several major
airlines (Pfeffer, 2014)—have no links to the Arab uprisings.
Against this background, the complexity of the initial response
of the Israeli government headed by Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu to the Arab uprisings appears to be at ﬁrst glance
surprisingly contradictory. On the one hand, Israel’s material
political action followed the pattern of a watching-and-waiting
approach—that is, Israel did not make any attempts to actively
interfere politically or militarily in the domestic affairs of Arab
countries highly affected by the Arab uprisings (Heller, 2014). On
the other hand, in terms of political communication, major
executive branches of the Israeli state pursued an alarmist policy:
The “Arab Spring” was presented to the global public as a
dangerous threat to Israel’s security.
In terms of the dimension of material political action, the
Israeli security policy responding to the Arab uprisings must be
analyzed and assessed against the background of the information
and knowledge the government could possibly have had in 2010
and thereafter—and not on the data and information available
today. Thus, ﬁrstly, the question of why Israel reacted with a
defensive watch-and-wait policy in the face of quite some regional
turmoil must be addressed seriously. Secondly, the question arises
as to what motivation Israel had to present the “Arab Spring” in
its political communication as a serious threat to its security
interests, although its “real” policy did not follow an alarmist
approach at all. Finally, how can the combination of these
seemingly heterogeneous policies be made sense of?
The research problem, whose empirical basis is to be described
in a survey-like manner in the next section, is to be addressed in
the light of two theoretical concepts: classic or orthodox
subjective rationalism and heterodox rationalism inspired by
the Copenhagen School. Then, in the frame of the analysis of
orthodox rationalism, this article will analyze whether and to
what degree (Neo-)Realism, Institutionalism, and Liberalism as
schools of thought of International Relations are capable of
making plausible the response of the Israeli government. These
schools of thought shed some light on the case, particularly on
Israeli material political action in response to the Arab uprisings,
but no fully satisfactory explanation is produced in regard to the
Israeli response on the level of political communication. The
heterodox concept to be applied embeds the idea of securitization
in a rationalist approach that claims that Israel as an occupational
power in the twenty-ﬁrst century (with its postcolonial
norms) is in constant need of legitimizing an extraordinary
measure—occupation of Palestine—by securitizing its regional
status. In this way, Israel was able to politically convert the
complexities triggered by the Arab uprisings into a securitization
policy that primarily targeted the (Western-dominated) interna-
tional community. Thus, the current article also develops a
theoretical perspective by applying the idea of securitization,
which is commonly used for the analysis of domestic politics, to
the international level. As the theoretical bridge between the two
Israeli policies is subjective rationalism, the empirical nexus
between them is occupation, as is to be elaborated in the
concluding section.
Israeli responses to the Arab uprisings: an overview
In terms of political communication, the Israeli response to the
Arab uprisings was rather harsh. In February 2011, it was leaked
that Israeli ofﬁcials warned of a situation similar to “Tehran
1979” rather than “Berlin 1989” (Magen, 2015: 117). This view
clearly contradicted the general positive Western view on the
“Arab Spring” in those days, both among leading politicians—
such as US President Barack Obama (2011) and EU Commission
President José Manuel Baroso (2011)—and scholars who
discussed the “Arab Spring” as a process of fundamental
transition to profoundly more liberal if not democratic political
systems (Roy, 2012). The metaphor of Berlin 1989 was then very
much in vogue indeed (Head, 2011).
As is well documented by Lehrs (2012), from the very
beginning of the Arab uprisings in Egypt, Netanyahu expressed
major reservations toward and mistrust of the potential of the
“Arab Spring”. In a conspicuous speech to the Israeli parliament
held on 23 November 2011, Netanyahu portrayed the “Arab
Spring” as a major threat to the West in general and Israel in
particular by portraying it as an “Islamic, anti-Western, anti-
liberal, anti-Israeli and anti-democratic wave” (quoted after
Ravid, 2011). This statement became the quasi-ofﬁcial guideline
for Israel’s policy toward the “Arab Spring” in terms of political
communication (Jones and Milton-Edwards, 2013: 400–401). The
signiﬁcantly more nuanced views of other prominent Israeli
politicians—such as then President Shimon Peres and Deputy
Prime Minister Natan Sharansky—did not have a major impact
on the Israeli political arena (Magen, 2015: 118). Also, the civil
society of Israel, whose population had more nuanced attitudes
toward the Arab uprisings than often portrayed (Pratto et al.,
2014: 88), had trouble shaping the public discourse (Zisser, 2016).
This also applies to scholarly attempts to take the “Arab Spring”
as a chance for getting engaged in the Middle East rather than
perceiving it as a threat (Podeh and Goren, 2013).
The alarmist Israeli speech acts could hardly contrast more
with the response in terms of material political action. In the
short period in which the “Arab Spring” seemed to be a local
Tunisian phenomenon, it had little effect on the Israeli political
class and the top decision-makers of Israel were not dealing with
the issue in person. However, when the wave spilled over to Egypt
and decade-long major ally of Israel, President Hosni Mubarak,
was forced to step down, Prime Minister Netanyahu, most
prominent heads of Israeli security-related institutions, and the
closest of his advisors got involved in the decision-making
process (Magen, 2015: 115). At the same time, Israel’s concerns
about potentially threatening developments related to the Arab
uprisings and its “pessimistic view of the Arab Spring” (Byman,
2011: 123–124) notwithstanding, its decision-making policy
followed a pattern of “wait and see,” as Magen (2015: 117) puts
it, or watch and wait: It is clear that Israel refrained from
responding to the Arab uprisings by taking any strong material
political action; at the same time, there are strong indicators that
Israel’s political leadership was on the qui vive of regional
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developments ever since Egypt had been caught by the “Arab
Spring.” How can the co-existence of Israel’s equanimous watch-
and-wait policy and its harsh response on the level of political
communication be made sense of?
Orthodox and heterodox rationalism
This article attempts to contribute to an explanation of two
seemingly contradictory aspects of the Israeli response to the
Arab uprisings in 2010/2011: a watch-and-wait policy on the level
of “material” political action on the one hand and a “much-
ado-about-nothing” policy in terms of “immaterial” political
action, that is, the presentation of the Arab uprisings as a major
security threat to Israel on the level of political communication,
on the other. Note that the differentiation between material and
immaterial political action should not be confused with more
conventional polar opposites such as realpolitik versus rhetoric.
Apart from the fact that the term realpolitik is commonly
associated with one particular school of thought of International
Relations—(Neo-)Realism—it is to be underlined that political
communication is a genuine and often far-reaching activity. One
of the major achievements of speech act theory is that it
transcends the conventional wisdom of the dichotomy between
words and deeds, as comes across in the proverb “An ounce of
performance is worth pounds of promises”. Rather, as a promise
is a performance, the collection of lecture series by the inventor of
speech act theory, Austin (1975) was wisely titled “How to do
things with words”.
Thus, adequate methodological and theoretical tools are
needed to embark on this endeavor. The demanding challenge
in this respect is how to identify Israeli (perceptions of) threats
and how to make sense of them. It is highly contested among
scholars whether “threats”—or any other abstract terms used by
scholars and political leaderships, respectively, to explain and
legitimize political actions—are basically objectively given or
genuinely dependent on perception (and thus in one way or the
other subjectively constructed). There are basically three
methodological ways to cope with this challenge, all of which
have their strengths, but also limitations. The ﬁrst one is to follow
an inductive approach and to reconstruct threat perceptions of
decision-makers by interviewing them (or, in practice, very often
those who advise them), exploring archive material, and studying
speeches of leading politicians and other forms of their publicly
accessible utterances. This manner of addressing the methodo-
logical challenge posed above has the advantage of catching the
ideas of decision-makers more or less directly. Thus, it will be
incorporated into the present article in the form of the
Copenhagen School-inspired approach. At the same time, this
way of dealing with the methodological challenge is not to be
considered a silver bullet, at least not for the purpose of the
present article, mainly for the reason that it cannot be excluded—
and it is even rather likely in cases of security-sensitive cases of
“high politics”—that political elites are less committed to “truth”
and “honesty” than to strategic and/or ideological convictions.
In other words, decision makers (and their advisors) may tell us
the absolute truth about the threats they perceive—or they may be
not. Although scholars may have some means of examining
whether statements and speeches reﬂect genuine beliefs, there is
no way to systematically extinguish errors.
The other two methodological ways are deductive, that is, they
use general ideas, which often qualify as sophisticated theories, to
inform about threats and threat perceptions. One deductive way
is to apply theories that outline the (threat) perceptions of a given
actor. Sophisticated versions of conceptualizing (mis)perceptions,
which in security studies in general was initiated by Jervis (1976),
borrow heavily from psychological concepts, for instance the
syndrome of a “people-apart” as developed by Arian (1989) and
the “bunker mentality” as presented by Krebs (2011). The concept
of bunker mentality has been further elaborated on
inter alia by Marzano (2013: 107–109) and applied to the “Arab
Spring” by Klein (2012): “the Arab Spring pushes Israel into a
self-defensive bunker mentality, which perceives events as
existential threats”. Analyses based on these psychological
concepts are certainly enriching. However, the validities of these
studies highly depend on the appropriateness and “truth” of the
underlying concept and their far-reaching psychological
assumptions.
As the two methodological ways outlined above are enriching
but not fully convincing, the present article aims to follow
another path of deductive analysis. In the following, I will outline
well-established theories of International Relations and thereafter
apply them to the present case study, thus contributing to
explaining Israel’s response to the “Arab Spring”. As theories of
International Relations have developed sophisticated concepts of
threats and threat perceptions, the methodological path chosen
promises to shed light on the research issue. The advantage of the
chosen approach vis-à-vis the inductive method is that it does
not have to bother with (mis)believing political leaderships. In
comparison to the bunker mentality approach, the one chosen
beneﬁts from two facts: ﬁrst, theories of International Relations
are more elaborate und thus suffer less from the potential ﬂaws of
an ad-hoc theory. Second, there is no need to make far-reaching
assumptions of irrationality. Yet, it is frankly admitted that the
method chosen also has its limitations: As theories will be applied,
the validity of the results depends on the quality of the theory.
To minimize the potential ﬂaws from this limitation, the analysis
starts with classic or orthodox rationalism, which, in the
discipline of International Relations, developed three main
schools of thought: (Neo-)Realism, Institutionalism (often labeled
Neo-Liberalism), and Liberalism. In other words, it is essential for
the present approach not to choose one theory from the very
beginning. Rather, all three major schools of thought of orthodox
rationalism must have a say, as all of them survived intense
debate in International Relations and should therefore not be
eliminated before checking their potential beneﬁt for the
empirical analysis of the present case.
Here is not the place to discuss whether a deductive or
inductive approach is more suitable in social sciences in general.
Yet, as far as the present issue is concerned, the deductive
approach outlined appears to be particularly promising. As the
“Arab Spring” triggered many new rapid developments in a
rather short period of time, the regional political environment of
Israel was in extremely high ﬂux. Therefore, if the research
approach in the present case were based on an inductive concept,
the danger would be that the researcher would have trouble
overcoming an agnostic position: Due to the impact of many new
variables to be examined, one could be stuck with a line of
argument according to which the actors simply could not
understand what was going on and what would come next. The
approach outlined above, however, gives us the chance to see
further as we stand on the shoulders of giants. Admittedly,
intellectual giants like the schools of thought used for the present
analysis may also fail, yet this danger is minimized in the present
analysis by taking seriously all major rationalist schools of
thought of International Relations.
Since the application of these three schools of thought
produces, on the one hand, some rich insights in terms of
answering the research question, but, on the other, also leaves
some questions unanswered, an alternative school of thought is
then to be applied: a securitization approach inspired by
the Constructivist concept of the Copenhagen School. The
Copenhagen securitization approach qualiﬁes best among other
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Constructivist approaches for the purpose of the present article,
as it meets the following two essential criteria: First, as the aim is
not to play the different schools of thought off against each other,
but to “peacefully” use the potentials of all of them for a more
comprehensive explanation of the research question,3 the
approach must be designed in a way that its epistemological
basis is compatible with the three orthodox rationalist schools of
thought. In other words, post-structuralist approaches are not
suitable for the present analysis (cf. Hasenclever et al., 2000).
Second, as the function of the heterodox approach for the present
analysis is mainly to catch the dimension of the political
communication of Israel’s response to the Arab uprisings, a
school of thought focussing on speech acts rather than on
empirical developments is preferable. Thus, the valid aspects of
criticism on the narrowness of the Copenhagen School from the
theoretical perspective of developing a comprehensive approach
notwithstanding (McDonald, 2008: 564, 570), for the present
analysis both factors discussed clearly favor the Copenhagen
school over alternatives such as the Paris School or a discourse
analysis as developed by Hansen (2006: Part I).
From an epistemological point of view, (Neo-)Realism,
Institutionalism, Liberalism, and the Copenhagen School as
designed in the present article are all based on “thin” (as opposed
to “thick) rationalism (Little, 1991: Chapter 3). Rationalism
assumes that actors have aims based on preferences and are
capable of identifying the most suitable strategy on how to
successfully pursue them. However, thin rationalism does not
claim that the actors’ preferences are (necessarily) a result of
rational reasoning. Rather, they are taken as a given: All four
schools of thought dealt with in the present article deﬁne them on
the basis of particular world views associated with them. In other
words, actors’ preferences are considered a result of speciﬁc
factors constraining and providing opportunities. In the case of
the three orthodox rationalist schools of thought, the preferences
are very much determined by structures—and are thus effectively
“objective”—whereas in the case of the Copenhagen School,
which heavily relies on Constructivist insights, security threats are
not fully determined by structures but are determined by the ways
the actors interpret them, i.e. they are “constructed” by speech
acts (Wendt, 1987). At the same time, all four schools of thought
are epistemologically connected through “subjective” rationalism:
States have aims and are capable of developing strategies, yet they
act under the condition of imperfect information, limited
capabilities, and uncertainty of the actions of others (Elster,
1985).
(Neo-)Realism, Institutionalism, and Liberalism on Israel’s
response to the Arab uprisings
In the following, the three orthodox rationalist schools of thought
are brieﬂy presented, focusing on two potential issues for Israeli
security concerns for each of them. In each case, the short
theoretical presentation is followed by an empirical application.
(Neo-)Realism on Israel’s response to the Arab uprisings
Security threats through shifts in regional power dispersion?
According to (Neo-)Realism, relative power capabilities are cru-
cial (Grieco et al., 2003): States cannot afford to focus on absolute
gains since the degree to which they are beneﬁcial to them
depends on whether they may possibly be overpowered by the
capabilities of other actors. Therefore, security threats are very
often the result of shifts in the distribution of power capabilities
on a global or regional scale. In the case of the Arab uprisings,
some scholars convincingly argue that the wave of revolts and
regime transformations brought along signiﬁcant changes in the
regional power system. Particularly in the immediate aftermath of
the downfall of Mubarak, according to Realist logic, due to the
anarchic Middle Eastern state system Israel was potentially
unsettled and concerned about potential power shifts (Amour,
2016: 4–6).
At the same time, with the exception of its foreign policy
toward Lebanon4 —which is a case of low relevance for the
present article, as the “Arab Spring” did not unsettle the Lebanese
political system—Israel has appeared as a “status quo power”
since 1967,5 when it managed to signiﬁcantly expand the territory
controlled by its government and military and establish an
occupational regime on Palestine that, according to Israel’s self-
concept, includes the dynamic expansion of Jewish settlements. In
that sense, however, as a contemporarily defensive power, Israel
could always rely on its superior capabilities toward other
potential regional powers in the Middle East (Byman, 2011: 129;
Inbar, 2013: 150ff; Magen, 2015: 128).
What power shifts materialized as an outcome of the Arab
uprisings and how did they affect Israel? Among the big ﬁve in
the Middle East—besides Israel, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey—some shifts relevant to Israel did indeed occur (Sandler,
2013: 133–134). As Egypt’s role as a potential regional power was
weakened because of its ongoing economic and political crisis, the
immediate effect for Israel was instead positive, since any
government in Cairo had a strong incentive not to lose its only
remaining foreign policy asset from a Western point of view: the
peace treaty with Israel. Thus, as early as February 2011, Israel got
reassurance from the top of the Egyptian military that the peace
treaty between the two countries would be maintained (Berti,
2013). However, some other Middle Eastern actors gained relative
power: Turkey (Altunışık, 2014), Iran (Fürtig, 2014), Saudi Arabia
(Al Tamamy, 2014), and also Qatar (Machowski, 2011), as well as
the newly emerged Islamic State (Inbar, 2016).
Turkey, whose relations with Israel had cooled down in the
years before the Arab uprisings, was strengthened particularly in
the period between the ﬁrst elections of an Islamist government
in 2011 in Tunisia and the usurpation of power by the Egyptian
military in July 2013, as Ankara then enjoyed leverage based on
the political ideology of moderate Islamism. Yet, although
Turkey’s ambition particularly in the Flotilla incident was to
pillory Israeli occupation policy, contrary to Iran’s foreign policy,
that of Turkey was never driven by a strong anti-Zionist stance
(Mor, 2014). Arguably, the Arab Spring even provided Israel with
opportunities to improve bilateral relations (Goren, 2012), as later
materialized in the reconciliation agreement in June 2016 (Times
of Israel, 2016). To what degree did Iran gain relative power as a
result of the Arab uprisings? The Iranian power gains were rather
limited insofar as the relative rise of Saudi Arabia, which due to
Egypt’s weakness has been able to unfold its potentials as an Arab
hegemon (Beck, 2015), and its increasingly active role in the
region served as a signiﬁcant compensation, despite the Wahhabi
regime not having diplomatic relations with Israel. Riyadh’s
foreign policy since 1979 has been to balance Iran and at the latest
since 1967 to moderate tensions between the Arab world and
Israel. Moreover, although Egyptian—Iranian relations of course
improved with the shift of presidency from Mubarak to Mursi,
they remained much more distant than generally expected (Aran,
2012: 57), as Egypt under Mursi distracted the hopes of Teheran
to “re-unite” Islamic forces by overcoming the Sunni—Shia rift
and refused to ﬁght in Syria side-by-side with Iran (George and
Awad, 2012; Klein, 2014). Also Qatar gained some relative power
with the Arab uprisings, at least until the 2013 military coup in
Egypt. However, the effects for Israel were very limited: relations
between Qatar and Israel had arguably been Israel’s warmest with
an Arab state in the two decades prior to the Arab uprisings. Yet,
heavy Qatari criticism of Israel’s Gaza war 2008/2009 cooled
relations down, and Qatari attempts to resume closer ties were
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disapproved of by the Israeli government (Ulrichsen, 2012).
Finally, the Islamic State emerged as a new power center in the
Middle East. However, its territorial expansion took place away
from the borders of Israel and inhibited adversaries of Israel,
particularly Iran, from unfolding their power capabilities in the
region. Accordingly, Inbar (2016) denominates the destruction of
the Islamic State as a strategic mistake because a rather weak
Islamic State is functional in curtailing Iranian inﬂuence in the
Levant.
Regional power shifts as triggered by the Arab uprisings had
mixed effects on Israel in terms of relative gains. At the same
time, it is safe to say that the Arab uprisings did not trigger major
changes in Israel’s power position in the Middle East. Thus, Israel
was at no point in the recent history of the Arab uprisings
seriously challenged by shifts in regional power dispersion.
Amour (2016: 14) goes so far as to state that Israel “remains the
top regional superpower”.
Security threats caused by failed states? Another Realist
potential security threat triggered by the Arab uprisings is caused
by effects of the failed-state syndrome. Before the Arab uprisings,
in many respects weak Arab states neighbouring Israel were
rather strong insofar as they controlled a monopoly of force in the
sense of Max Weber (cf. Ayubi, 1995). However, the most sen-
sitive borders and demarcation lines of Israel—the border to
Jordan as by far the longest and the boundaries to the Palestinian
territories as by far the most politically contested—were not
affected by the “Arab Spring”, simply because both the Hashemite
Kingdom (Aran, 2012: 59) and the Palestinian Authority
(Al-Omari, 2015) did not face major upheavals during the Arab
uprisings and continued their effective security cooperation with
Israel. However, Syria (Rotberg, 2014), and, albeit to a much
lesser degree, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula (Jacoby, 2013: 32)
have been showing signs of failing as states and state territories,
respectively, since the early days of the “Arab Spring”. Indeed
Israel faced some border incidents (Eglash, 2015). However, some
severe events such as an attack on 18 August 2011, implemented
by militants inﬁltrating Israel through the Sinai Peninsula, which
caused eight Israeli death casualties (Jacoby, 2013: 32)—not-
withstanding, Israel was not exposed to a systematic, large-scale
terrorist threat from Egyptian and Syrian territory (Sandler, 2013:
132). Violent conﬂict in Syria had reached a high level of turmoil
and certainly exceeded the limits of a domestic civil war, parti-
cularly toward Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and to a certain degree
Jordan—but not toward Israel. Particularly remarkable is the fact
that the highly violent and oppressive policy of the Islamic State
toward different Muslim groups, Christians, Yazidis, and Kurds
inter alia did not include Jewish Israel and there are no strong
indicators that this could change in the foreseeable future.
Institutionalism on Israel’s response to the Arab uprisings.
Contrary to (Neo-)Realism, Institutionalism portrays (interna-
tional) institutions as (often) inﬂuential structures and/or actors
that (sometimes) enjoy a life of their own (Keohane, 1989), which
may facilitate, but sometimes also hinder, cooperation. The
Middle East stands out as a world region with a rather low degree
of regional cooperation—and Israel’s integration into regional
organizations and agreements is particularly underdeveloped
(Beck, 2015). Yet, the Israeli—Egyptian peace treaty that was
negotiated, concluded, and ﬁnally signed under American
patronage in 1979 arguably had a signiﬁcant impact on Israeli-
Egyptian inter-governmental relations and on regional affairs. At
the same time, it never became a “warm” peace accepted and
vitalized by the respective civil societies—particularly Egyptian
society has always remained very reserved (Bar-Siman-Tov,
2000). Thus, on the eve of the “Arab Spring”, institutions had a
double impact on Israeli-Egyptian relations. On the one hand, the
treaty created a state of affairs that fostered cooperation on the
governmental level in several realms, of which security is of high
relevance for the purpose of the present article, and facilitated
Israel’s ability to maintain occupation of the Palestinian terri-
tories conquered in 1967, as the “Arab front” against Israel and its
occupation policy had lost its most powerful member. On the
other hand, the weakness of Egyptian civil-society-dominated
organizations, as caused by Cairo’s authoritarianism, prevented
potential “spoilers” of the cold peace on the societal level from
going through with their agenda.
When Egypt cancelled a 20-year-old gas contract with Israel in
2012, some Israeli politicians reacted with disgruntlement. Yet
foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman explicitly refrained from
taking the Egyptian decision as an issue of “high politics”: “I think
that to turn a business dispute into a diplomatic dispute would be
a mistake” (quoted after Sherwood, 2012). Not least due to
discoveries in their own gas ﬁelds, Israeli proved to be
invulnerable to the termination of the Egyptian deliveries
(Jewish Virtual Library, 2016).
The second Arab country with which Israel enjoys the beneﬁts
of a formal peace treaty is Jordan. In Jordan, however, the level of
protests in 2011 was incomparably lower than in Egypt and never
reached the momentum of seriously challenging the Hashemite
regime in Amman (Beck and Hüser, 2015). Thus, at no point in
recent history has Israel had to be seriously concerned about the
stability of its effective security cooperation with Jordan
(Schenker, 2014).
Security threats because of weakened inter-state institutions?
One of the immediate concerns of the Israeli political elite after
the downfall of Mubarak was that new governments that arose as
a result of the Arab uprisings could terminate the Camp David
peace treaty because of its unpopularity (Asseburg, 2012: 84;
Federman and Barzak, 2012). However, the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces, which took over power after the downfall of
Mubarak, unsurprisingly maintained its well-coordinated rela-
tions with Israel. Yet, the Islamist government headed by
President Mursi also left no doubt that it would stick to the basics
of the peace treaty (Sobczak, 2012; Katz, 2014: 79). As the
Egyptian military, in compliance with Western interests, mana-
ged to dominate national security affairs even in the heyday of
Mursi’s presidency, there was no moment in history when Israel
was seriously challenged by undermined Camp David peace
accords.
Security threats because of strengthened anti-Israeli institu-
tions? As a result of the Arab uprisings, national institutions,
particularly parliaments, that had been marginalized under the
old regimes were (re)vitalized as an outcome of fair and free
elections (Völkel, 2014). In Egypt, the ﬁrst elections after the
downfall of Mubarak resulted in clear victories for Islamist
political parties, whose ideological leaders came from the Muslim
Brotherhood and Salaﬁ movements. Thus, at ﬁrst glance it seems
that from an Israeli viewpoint there was a potentially challenging
development unfolding: institutions, particularly the parliament,
many deputies of which were actually or potentially critical of the
peace treaty with Israel in particular and Zionism in general,
apparently gained room to manoeuvre. However, the new con-
stitution that Mursi pushed through with a hastily arranged
referendum did not touch the political prerogatives of the pro-
Israeli Egyptian military (Ottaway, 2013). On the level of ideol-
ogy, the Muslim Brotherhood oriented itself much more toward
moderate Islamist Turkey than toward the Iranian model
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(Kassem, 2013). When a mob looted the Israeli embassy in Cairo
in September 2011, it failed to receive support from the leadership
of the Muslim Brotherhood and the army did not hesitate to
contain the attack. Moreover, by declaring a state of alert, the
military signalled its readiness to actively defend the good rela-
tions with Israel on the state level (Fahmy, 2011). Seventy-six
persons were convicted by Egyptian courts for their participation
in the incident (Times of Israel, 2012). Therefore, from the per-
spective of Institutionalism it was always visible to Israel that the
strengthened role of actors from “below” did not constitute a
severe security threat. After the downfall of Mursi, Israeli-
Egyptian relations became even more effective than in the era of
Mubarak, particularly since al-Sisi who took power in July 2013,
shared a hostile stance toward Hamas and was subsequently
ready to squeeze Hamas in cooperation with Israel (Magen,
2015: 120).
Liberalism on Israel’s response to the Arab uprisings
Transition processes as a threat? At ﬁrst glance, the Arab
uprisings did not constitute any potential challenge for Israel
from a Liberalist perspective. One of the main contributions to
International Relations of Liberalism, which emphasizes the role
of societal forces in international politics (Moravcsik, 1997), is the
democratic peace theorem: democracies refrain from waging wars
against one another (Brown et al., 1996). Therefore, if as a long-
term result of the Arab uprisings one or several Arab democracies
should emerge, Israel’s security situation would signiﬁcantly
improve. However, the teleological transition paradigm as
developed in the late twentieth century, according to which the
emergence of fully ﬂedged democracies is the quasi-natural out-
come of transformation processes triggered by the downfall of
authoritarian regimes, has been proven highly problematic
(Carothers, 2002). Yet, even if democracies emerge, this outcome
is inherently preceded by transition processes during which
regimes often resort to aggressive foreign policies (Norlén, 2012),
since this enables them to distract from deﬁcits of their perfor-
mance in domestic politics.6 Owing to widespread anti-Zionist
sentiment in the Arab world, democratization could convert into
governmental policies threatening Israel (Bresheeth, 2012).
However, at the latest in 2012 it was rather obvious that the
Arab uprisings had not triggered a smooth transition to
democracy, particularly not in Egypt (Stepan and Linz, 2013).
The only exception might be Tunisia, whose limited power
capabilities and geographic distance prevent it, however, from
being a threat to Israel’s security. In general, because of the
superiority of Israel in terms of military, economic, and political
power, Israel was in a position of strength, which is built on a
knowledge-based high-tech economy, whereas the neighbouring
developing countries have been in decline for decades. One of the
many indicators for Israel’s superiority vis-à-vis its neighbouring
countries is its comparatively high level of foreign currency
reserves (Levitt, 2013). Israel also enjoys one of the most
sophisticated armies on a global scale, which would be capable
of countering any military attack from its neighbouring countries.
Last but not least, Israel maintains a “special relationship” with
the United States, which from a Liberalist perspective, is
particularly stable, as it is strongly backed by the most powerful
political actors in American domestic politics (Mearsheimer and
Walt, 2007; Cavari and Nyer, 2016).
Threats through Islamism? As Liberalists put emphasis on the
role of social groups in inﬂuencing and even enacting foreign
policies, their perspective poses the question of whether Israel
might have feared, as a threat to its security, the growing role of
the Islamist groups which were empowered as a result of regime
changes in Egypt and Syria (as well as Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and
other countries affected by the “Arab Spring”, all of which are,
however, geographically too distant to create a (potential) threat
to Israel). Many of the rank and ﬁle in Islamist organizations in
Egypt were ideologically clearly distant to Israel (as many other
political movements in the nationalist and leftist camps). Yet, the
mass basis of Islamist organizations prioritized changes and
reforms in domestic politics and took a moderate stance in for-
eign affairs toward Israel (Hamid, 2011). The leadership of the
Muslim Brotherhood refrained from altering Egypt’s foreign
policy, which continued to be controlled by the military to a high
degree (Shama, 2014: Chapter 5). This included active reassur-
ance that Egypt would stick to the peace treaty with Israel. Pre-
sident Mursi even pressured Hamas to moderate and reconcile
with Fatah, thereby mitigating Israeli security threats from the
Gaza Strip (Berti, 2013: 143; Dickstein, 2014/15).
Contrary to the main Islamist groups in Egypt, those that took
over power in parts of Syria were extremists in the sense of
decisive hostility toward other religious groups in the Middle
East: The Islamic State declared a caliphate and established a
regime that acted aggressively toward the opposition and groups
whose religious afﬁliation was considered hostile. Thus, the
Islamic State was also very much preoccupied with domestic
affairs (Bundel, 2015). It is remarkable that all Islamist groups
that were (temporarily) strengthened by the Arab uprisings in
Arab countries neighbouring Israel had a foreign policy agenda
that was signiﬁcantly less hostile toward Israel than the Egyptian
and Syrian regimes in the 1950s and 1960s, when under the
regional leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Nasir anti-
Zionist pan-Arabism served as the ideological guideline for
Middle Eastern regional affairs (Abou-El-Fadl, 2015).
Much ado about nothing and/or securitization policy?
According to analyses based on criteria for security threats from
different rationalist schools of thought, Israel’s security was at no
point in the contemporary history of the Arab uprisings and its
aftermath “objectively” challenged. This preliminary ﬁnding of
the present article is conﬁrmed by all rationalist perspectives
applied to potential Israeli concerns. Based on the assumption
that Israel has been a status quo power since 1967, this political
scientiﬁc ﬁnding harmonizes with Israel’s material policy during
the Arab uprisings and its aftermath: a watchful but equanimous
wait-and-see policy out of a position of strength (Magen, 2015:
117; Zisser, 2015).
However, as clear as the ﬁndings of the orthodox rationalist
analysis are in terms of Israel’s material policy, the more puzzled
the observer is left in terms of the harsh political communication
of Israel toward the “Arab Spring”. This central aspect of Israeli
policy can hardly be made sense of from the perspective of
orthodox rationalism: The analysis produced no signiﬁcant
indicator that Israel could possibly have perceived a serious
threat to its security from neighbouring countries. Thus, the
contribution of orthodox rationalism to the Israeli political
communication concerning the Arab uprising would be conﬁned
to assessing it as a much-ado-about-nothing policy without
providing any substantial explanation for it.
This, however, does not mean that scholars committed to
rationalism should give up ﬁnding a comprehensive explanation
for the Israeli policy toward the Arab uprisings. Rather, it appears
promising to apply a heterodox approach inspired by the
Copenhagen School. The basic idea of the Copenhagen School
is that political actors, governments, or social groups mostly
acting through government, are able to legitimize extraordinary
measures when they successfully securitize a political issue.
Securitization is thus an extreme form of politicizing a social issue
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(Buzan et al., 1998: 23). Contrary to orthodox rationalism,
(security) policy is not (primarily) taken as a result of structural
factors. Rather, whether an issue is considered relevant to security
is determined by perlocutionary speech acts as outlined in the
Constructivist speech act theory elaborated by Searle (1969).
Therefore, social issues that are “objectively”—for instance
measured by the number of death casualties—less signiﬁcant,
may still be perceived as major security issues. For instance,
although it appears contestable whether it is more harmful to
oneself and others to consume cannabis (or dog meat) than
alcohol (or beef), respectively, the commercial production and
sale of the former but not the latter have become criminalized in
many Western societies. In a similar way, it is striking that in
European societies a ban of the burqa has recently been
intensively debated, in some cases even enacted, whereas hiding
one’s face in the frame of carnival rituals has not been addressed,
although in Europe much more severe cases of crimes such as
rape have been committed under the cover of the anonymity
provided by carnival costumes than burqas.
The concept outlined borrows heavily from social constructi-
vism. Yet, in the approach developed in this article, the
constitutive element of social constructivism has been embedded
in the concept of thin rationalism: securitization as outlined in
the present article is a deliberate policy of strategic actors to
justify policies that otherwise would be difﬁcult to legitimize. This
embedment of the Copenhagen School-inspired approach in
rationalism is essential for the argument of the present article, as
the insights of the analysis based on orthodox rationalism are
then a valid part of the overall analysis.
Another crucial element of the heterodox rationalist approach
as sketched in the present article is that, contrary to the approach
of the mainstream Copenhagen School, it does not focus on the
national level of the political system. It has already been shown
that the basic idea of the Copenhagen School can also be
expanded to other levels beyond national politics (Zwitter and
de Wilde, 2010). The present approach is an attempt to expand
the idea of the Copenhagen approach to the international level.
The primary target audience of a securitization policy may be the
“international community” (cf. Bliesemann de Guevara and
Kühn, 2009). This is so for two interconnected reasons. First, in
contrast to a global great power or superpower, the room Israel has
for manoeuvre as a middle power on a global scale and its
positioning in the international system depends to a higher degree
on the support of more powerful actors in the international system,
particularly the United States and the leading members of the
European Union (cf. Nolte, 2010). Second, under “normal”
conditions, embeddedness in the (Western-dominated) interna-
tional community requires the compliance of norms such as
respecting international law and human rights. Although many
states, among them Israel, are much too strong to become the
“victim” of humanitarian intervention (cf. Finnemore, 1996), their
identity often does not allow them to more or less bluntly stand by
norm violations. As states have an incentive to be considered
integral members of the “civilized world”, they need to ﬁnd ways to
justify norm violations. Securitization is a powerful means to
acquire legitimacy for “extraordinary policies”—that is, foreign
policies that exceed the limits of generally accepted political
activities—on the international level.
Israel is under constant diplomatic pressure to legitimize the
occupation of the Palestinian territories conquered in 1967. In
contrast to the territories that Israel controlled after the ﬁrst
Israeli—Arab war in 1948/49, the international community never
recognized the Palestinian territories as a legitimate part of the
state of Israel. Even Israel’s main ally, the United States, has
refrained from moving its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,
notwithstanding that the Knesset in 1980 declared in a basic law
that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”
(Knesset, 2009). Many actors in the international system,
including the European Union, consider the settlements in East
Jerusalem and the West Bank, which are host to over half a
million Israeli Jews, as illegal. Recently, Palestine obtained a clear
majority for upgrade to being a non-member observer state in the
United Nations (Beck, 2016). According to global polls, Israel’s
reputation beyond the United States is rather negative (Jones and
Milton-Edwards, 2013: 407). In 2014, the British, French, and
Irish parliaments opted for full recognition of Palestine as a state,
in Sweden this was even granted by the government. In the light
of all that, Israel has been portrayed more and more as a
colonizing state which constantly violates basic human rights
prescriptions that have guided normative principles of interna-
tional relations since the end of the era of colonization
(cf. Finnemore, 1996).
At the same time, Israel has a strong interest in being embraced
as a member of the “civilized” international community. A good
indicator for Israel’s eagerness to maintain its status as a respected
part of the “civilized” world is its partly fearful response to the
BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) movement: A rather
irrelevant actor in terms of hard power is perceived by signiﬁcant
members of the Israeli political class as a real threat due to its
strong soft power capabilities (Shalev, 2015). The reason is that
actors such as the BDS are indeed capable of performing speech
acts with the potential of shaping a discourse that cannot be easily
countered by Israel without violating anticolonial norms and
principles of human rights.
Internationally securitizing events and developments—for
instance, by portraying the Arab uprisings as a security threat
to Israel—is the most effective tool available to Israel to counter
debates in which the state of Israel appears to be a deliberate
colonial power constantly violating post colonial values. For the
Israeli political leadership the “Islamic Winter” served as
justiﬁcation for prolonged occupation. Netanyahu justiﬁed
military presence in the West Bank by referring to the potential
take-over of Palestine by Iranian forces (Sandler, 2013: 132).
Through securitization policies, a new normative light is shed on
Israel’s attitude toward the occupation of Palestine: ﬁrst, despite
extensive settlement of Palestine, occupation, albeit in principle
undesirable, appears to be a policy that is hard to avoid—as long
as Israel is surrounded by “enemies” that are already controlling
major parts of Palestine and just waiting to bring in Palestine
once it should acquire independence. In his speech delivered at
the “Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish
Organizations” in February 2014, Netanyahu took a gloomy view
in reference to the situation in the Middle East and the strategic
implications for an agreement with the Palestinians: “The whole
land is convulsing, there are earthquakes everywhere you go. And
how are we to be sure that areas that we cede to the Palestinians
will not be taken over by Hamas and Hezbollah and Al-Queda
and Salaﬁs” (quoted after Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce, 2014).
Second, despite occupation having endured for nearly 50 years,
securitization policies make it appear to be a temporary measure
that would be reconsidered as soon as context conditions
improved (cf. Sandler, 2013: 132–140). Moreover, part of Israel’s
securitization policy concerning the Arab uprisings was that Iran
could be portrayed as a new strongman in the Middle East as
Egypt was weakened by the Arab uprisings, although a sober
analysis based on insights of orthodox rationalist thinking, as
presented above, reveals that Iran’s relative gains in the Arab
Spring were—at least partially—countered by those of its major
foe Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the gap between the power
capabilities of Israel on the one hand and those of other Middle
Eastern powers on the other was so huge that Israel could not be
seriously challenged. The Israeli policy concerning the “Arab
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Spring” and how it is linked to Iran is one of rather complex
securitization—not just a simple policy of “distraction” from
occupation of Palestine (cf. Watad, 2015).
Conclusion
The present article has attempted to grasp an at ﬁrst sight very
heterogeneous, if not contradictory, policy in that sense that Israel
followed both a policy of “watching and waiting” in terms of
material political action and a “much-ado-about-nothing” policy
in terms of immaterial political action. Israel reacted to the Arab
uprisings on the level of its “factual” policy with a watchful but
equanimous policy, whereas in the imagery of its political
communication, it pursued a harsh policy, portraying the Arab
uprisings as a serious threat to Israel’s security interests. It has
been shown that the dual strategy of Israel can be made sense of
when applying a thin rationalist approach drawing on orthodox
and heterodox theoretical insights. The analyses based on the
major orthodox rationalist schools of thought of International
Relations—(Neo-)Realism, Institutionalism, and Liberalism—all
conﬁrm that the Israeli watch-and-wait policy was the best
available strategy given the fact that—with the exception of
Lebanon—Israel has acted as a status quo-oriented power since
the occupation of Palestine in 1967. At no point of history was
Israel “objectively” threatened by the Arab uprisings and its
immediate repercussions.
In the present case, the “concept” of occupation is crucial to
connecting orthodox and heterodox ideas of subjective rational-
ism in a meaningful way. It provides, at the same time, the
empirical link that helps to comprehend a crucial aspect of Israel’s
response to the Arab uprisings: securitizing the “Arab Spring”
contributed to Israel’s ability to maintain its position as an
integral member of the “civilized” (Western) community.
Israel’s sophisticated approach contributed to legitimizing the
extraordinary measure of occupation, which under “normal”
circumstances would be difﬁcult to justify in the light of
postcolonial norms.
On the level of material policies, occupation caused Israel to
become a status-quo oriented power with capabilities so much
superior to all other potential Middle Eastern regional powers
that in the face of the Arab uprisings it was most rational to
pursue a watch- and-wait policy. Similarly, due to its occupation
of Palestine, Israel, being constantly under normative pressure,
had a strong incentive to securitize the Arab uprisings which it
did with much ado on the level of political communication.
Thus, the added value of the present article consists in
contributing to dissolving the puzzle of a seemingly contradictory
policy with the help of theoretical tools, whereas an inductive
approach would in the present case have trouble overcoming an
agnostic position. Of course, whether the present article may
claim a gain in insights vis-à-vis post-structuralist approaches
depends to a high degree on the issue whether the attempt to
explain human behavior and basic categories constitutive for thin
rationalism are accepted as meaningful from an epistemological
and ontological perspective. It is to be admitted that the approach
applied in the present article implies some far-reaching assump-
tions such as that actors have preferences and that their
intentions play a role in shaping their material and immaterial
actions. However, in comparison to approaches that heavily
borrow from insights of the discipline of psychology—such as the
concepts of bunker mentality and the people-apart syndrome—
the present analysis approximates the ideal of epistemological
parsimony to a higher degree. Moreover, the two psychological
concepts, which were originally developed to grasp particular
mentalities of (major segments of) the Israeli society, appear more
plausible when analyzing the behavior of the Israeli society as a
more or less coherent collective unity. However, this article has
focused on the Israeli political leadership, thereby following the
principle that we should try hard to make sense of a behavior as
strategic factor before giving in by adding far-reaching psycho-
logical factors. The claim is not that this method will always
succeed; however, the response of the Israeli political leadership
toward the Arab uprisings could be made sense of without relying
on psychological categories.
The idea that securitization aims not only at the domestic, but
sometimes also at the international level, deserves more attention.
The present article has dealt with a case in which an actor turns
to a securitization policy toward the international community in
order to legitimize a policy that massively violates basic human
rights. Certainly, Israel is not the only state that attempts to
legitimize the massive constraints of the rights of other peoples by
securitization policies targeting the international community.
Comparative studies could shed some light on this phenomenon
and thereby identify success conditions: Why is Israel quite
effective in maintaining its position as an integral part of the
“civilized” international community—and this despite signiﬁcant
resistance from quite a number of states of the Global South and
considerable segments of civil movements not only in the Arab
world, but also in Europe and the United States? This also touches
the issue of imposing or not imposing sanction regimes on states
in the Middle East and beyond. Furthermore, the question arises
to what degree securitization toward the international community
is an outcome of intentional (or strategic) policy and/or of
identity features. How are identities prone to securitization
toward the international community developed? This also leads to
the question why and how “objectively” limited potential threats
are magniﬁed as essential and even presented as “existential
threats.” Last but not least, the idea of securitization toward the
international community may also be applied to policy responses
of Western states (and non-Western-like states like Russia and
Saudi Arabia) to terror threats and attacks, which in some cases
triggered highly discriminatory securitization policies particularly
toward Middle Eastern actors.
Notes
1 The effects on Israeli domestic affairs—the summer protests of 2011 being partially
inspired by the “Arab Spring” (Wallach, 2013)—are beyond the scope of the present
article.
2 In their painstaking analysis of the Arab uprisings and their impact on Palestinian
violence directed against Israel in Israel and occupied Palestine, Bhavnani and Donnay
(2012: 129) come to the conclusion that the link is insigniﬁcant. Although his per-
spective might be overly optimistic, it is worth mentioning that Davis (2014) believes
that the “Arab Spring” created new potentials for Israeli—Palestinian cooperation
through non-governmental partnerships.
3 For a critical assessment of the International Relations paradigm change from the
period of theoretical warfare, in which scholars sent out different schools of thought
like battleships, to theoretical peace and the acknowledgement of pluralism, see Dunne
et al. (2013).
4 Both in 1982 and 2006 Israel waged war with Lebanon in order to signiﬁcantly weaken,
if not destroy, adversaries: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hizbollah,
respectively.
5 Among other scholars Shlaim (2000) presents strong arguments that Israel historically
acted as an offensive power.
6 A similar scholarly argument has been used to rationalize Israeli reluctance to accept
the establishment of a Palestinian state (Inbar and Sandler, 1997).
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